LiteLLM 1.107.0 on PyPI and Docker was poisoned with a credential stealer and RAT after attackers took GitHub tokens from an exposed internal LiteLLM deployment's logs, where LiteLLM says Claude Code had embedded them
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- Published
- 2026-10-22
- Type
- News
- Organization
- LiteLLM
- Source
- agipulse
Why it matters
【Key points】
On Oct 21, LiteLLM, the open-source gateway that routes traffic to dozens of LLM providers (~23M weekly downloads per Datadog), confirmed attackers hijacked its release pipeline and shipped a poisoned v1.107.0. All seven PyPI wheels were live 11:39–13:23 UTC. Docker tags v1.107.0/latest/main-latest/main-stable pointed to a bad image 11:46–14:20 UTC. The GitHub source was clean and the enterprise registry was unaffected.
The payload runs on every Python start without importing litellm. It steals cloud, SSH, Kubernetes, CI, browser and AI-tool (~/.claude, ~/.cursor) secrets and fetches remote code hourly.
LiteLLM's preliminary account: the attacker got into an internet-exposed internal LiteLLM deployment and lifted three developers' GitHub CLI tokens from its logs. LiteLLM says Claude Code can sometimes embed those tokens in responses. An org-owner token disabled branch protection and pointed the release at a lookalike repo, Berri-AI/litellm. Fix: delete cook.pth/cook.py/sitecustomize.py before running pip, pin 1.106.2, rotate every reachable secret.
【Verifiable】
https://docs.litellm.ai/blog/security-incident-oct-21-2026
https://osv.dev/vulnerability/MAL-2026-2144
https://securitylabs.datadoghq.com/articles/litellm-compromised-pypi-docker/
https://www.ox.security/blog/litellm-1-107-0-compromised-with-a-rat-infostealer/
【Our read】
1. It is LiteLLM's second poisoning this year. Post-March hardening (private release repo, trusted publishing, a single locked laptop) was bypassed with stolen tokens, not code flaws.
2. Unlike Storm-0940 (e/1031), where attackers used AI tools, here the AI toolchain's own logs leaked the keys. A gateway holds every provider key a company has.
3. Treat agent and gateway logs as secrets, and pin versions. Open questions: initial access, the Claude Code conditions (no Anthropic comment yet) and victim count.
Related developments
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